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Abstract Many models of professional self-regulation call upon individual practitioners
to take responsibility both for identifying the limits of their own skills and for redressing
their identiﬁed limits through continuing professional development activities. Despite these
expectations, a considerable literature in the domain of self-assessment has questioned the
ability of the self-regulating professional to enact this process effectively. In response,
authors have recently suggested that the construction of self-assessment as represented in
the self-regulation literature is, itself, problematic. In this paper we report a pair of studies
that examine the relationship between self-assessment (a global judgment of one’s ability
in a particular domain) and self-monitoring (a moment-by-moment awareness of the
likelihood that one maintains the skill/knowledge to act in a particular situation). These
studies reveal that, despite poor correlations between performance and self-assessments
(consistent with what is typically seen in the self-assessment literature), participant per-
formance was strongly related to several measures of self-monitoring including: the
decision to answer or defer responding to a question, the amount of time required to make
that decision to answer or defer, and the conﬁdence expressed in an answer when provided.
This apparent divergence between poor overall self-assessment and effective self-moni-
toring is considered in terms of how the ﬁndings might inform our understanding of the
cognitive mechanisms yielding both self-monitoring judgments and self-assessments and
how that understanding might be used to better direct education and learning efforts.
Keywords Self-assessment  Self-monitoring  Professional self-regulation 
Self-directed learning
Although many models of professional self-regulation and many health professional
training curricula worldwide have incorporated some form of planned self-assessment
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DOI 10.1007/s10459-010-9263-2activity into their educational process (Sargeant et al. 2010), there is now a well established
literature that raises doubts about the capacity of individuals to effectively self-assess
either personal (Dunning et al. 2004) or professional (Gordon 1991; Boud 1995; Davis
et al. 2006) areas of relative strength and weakness. Increasingly it is being recognized that
self-assessment as ‘‘a process of personal reﬂection based on an unguided review of
practice and experience for the purposes of making judgments regarding one’s own current
level of knowledge, skills, and understanding as a prequel to self-directed learning
activities that will improve overall performance and thereby maintain competence’’ (Eva
and Regehr 2007, p. 81) is inherently ﬂawed. As a result, research in the ﬁeld has begun to
move away from efforts to quantify the self-assessment ability of individuals using ‘‘guess
your grade’’ (Colliver et al. 2005) research designs, toward efforts to understand the nature
and sources of this inaccuracy (e.g., Kruger and Dunning 1999; Hodges et al. 2001; Eva
and Regehr 2005).
As part of this re-emphasis, Eva and Regehr (2007) have drawn a theoretical and
methodological distinction between self-assessment as a cumulative evaluation of overall
performance, and self-assessment as a process of self-monitoring performance in the
moment. Building on ﬁndings in the literature that suggest experts spontaneously ‘‘slow
down’’ when faced with personally challenging situations or problems (Norman et al.
1989), they presented research participants with 60 trivia questions and asked these
participants to answer when they were conﬁdent that they could do so accurately or to
pass when they felt unable to answer with conﬁdence. After viewing all 60 questions,
participants were asked to make their best guess in response to questions they chose not
to answer during the ﬁrst presentation. Participants were timed with regard to the speed
with which they made their decision to either answer or pass in the ﬁrst round. Eva and
Regehr found numerous indications that self-monitoring is an importantly different (and
substantially more accurate) process relative to self-assessment. Answers were much
more likely to be correct for items that participants chose to answer in the ﬁrst round
(relative to questions that were not answered until the second round) and, in particular,
when they made the decision to answer/pass quickly. This was true despite the fact that
participants’ overall judgments of the strength of their knowledge replicated the typi-
cally poor correlations with performance seen in other self-assessment studies. Taken
together, these ﬁndings suggest that at least one source of inaccuracy in overall self-
assessments may be an inability to effectively mentally aggregate performance over past
events despite an apparent capacity to effectively self-monitor in the moment for each
event.
However, a number of questions remain. For example, Eva and Regehr’s (2007) evi-
dence of effective self-monitoring in the moment was largely circumstantial based on
behavioural patterns. They did not collect data that would allow a determination of whether
participants were consciously aware of their likelihood of success in the moment, or
whether these behavioural indices were largely measures of unconscious processing. The
extent to which participants have conscious access to their ongoing determinations of
likely success in the moment has important implications for how they might more effec-
tively use this ability to slow down when they should (Moulton et al. 2007), not only for
safer practice in the moment, but also for future improvement (cf. Regehr and Mylopoulos
2008). That is, with the considerable emphasis placed on self-directed learning in the
health professions it is important to determine: (1) how self-monitoring might inﬂuence
continuing professional development activities; (2) whether or not explicit prompts to self-
monitor alter those tendencies; and (3) whether or not the learning activities in turn alter
self-perceptions in a meaningful way.
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123In this paper we present the results from two studies aimed at testing:
(a) whether or not individuals are consciously self-aware of their likelihood of success in
speciﬁc situations (i.e., do explicit conﬁdence ratings mimic the behavioural
indications of accurate self-monitoring reported in previous work?)
(b) whether or not any such awareness (i.e., conscious or otherwise) dictates individuals’
efforts to search for the information that would help them solve the problems
encountered (i.e., do self-monitoring indicators relate to the likelihood of searching for
the correct answer to a question when given the opportunity to conduct an internet
search), and
(c) whether or not those efforts in turn inﬂuence participants’ overall self-assessments
(i.e., does the accuracy of individuals’ overall self-assessments change as a result of a
self-monitoring experience?).
In addition, for study 2 we manipulated the response format, utilizing both short answer
questions (SAQ) and multiple-choice questions (MCQ) in an effort to begin exploring the
extent to which the increased accuracy of self-monitoring relative to self-assessment is better
characterized as an indication of the temporal relationship between the performance and the
judgment (i.e.,overallvsmoment-by-moment) orasanindication ofthetask requirements of
the self-monitoring judgment. That is, in deciding whether or not one has the capacity to
answer a short answer question one can be guided by the directly relevant information of
whetherornotaresponseisgeneratedthatseemslikelytobeaccurate.Incontrast,ifoneknows
response alternatives will be presented in MCQ format one might feel conﬁdent in one’s
capacitytoanswernotonlybytheabilitytogenerateaplausibleresponse,butalsobyafeeling
of knowing leading to anticipation that one could identify the correct answer if given alter-
natives from which to choose. Indeed, the literature on feeling-of-knowing judgments in
psychology would suggest that feeling-of-knowing judgments are based on heuristics that
operateautomaticallyandunconsciously(Koriat2000).Thesemechanismswouldseemtobe
aligned well with the mechanisms that have been postulated to make self-assessment
untrustworthy (i.e., difﬁculty mentally aggregating past experiences). By manipulating
responseformatasavariableinStudy2weofferpreliminaryinformationregardingwhenand
howself-monitoringislikelytoaccuratelyreﬂectawarenessofthelimitsofone’scompetence.
Study 1: Methods
Participants
Participants were recruited from undergraduate Psychology courses at McMaster Uni-
versity. Informed consent was collected and, in exchange for their participation, subjects
received either bonus credits toward their coursework or a $10 stipend. Ethics approval
was granted by McMaster University’s Faculty of Health Sciences Research Ethics Board.
Materials
Participants were presented with 60 general knowledge trivia questions, 10 from each of 6
domains. Study 1 used the same set of questions as were used by Eva and Regehr (2007).
These questions were drawn from a norming study in which Nelson and Narens (1980)
asked a large number of questions to a large number of individuals to determine the
probability of answering each question correctly. Questions were selected from this set to
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according to the 1980 norms. The domains included were geography, history, literature,
pre-1990s entertainment, science, and sports.
Procedure
A computer-based platform was developed to present each of the 60 questions in turn. The
basic design was consistent with that of Eva and Regehr (2007) with modiﬁcations made as
illustrated in Fig. 1. Participants were told they would be asked to answer a series of trivia
questions and that a correction factor would be imposed such that the number of incorrect
Self-assessment 
measures
Protocol Self-monitoring measures
Choose a trivia category
↓
Predictions correlated 
with performance  ⇐
     (Table 3)
Predict number of questions (/10) you anticipate 
answering correctly
↓
Question presented
↓
↓ ↓
↓ ↓
Decide to answer or pass ⇒  Decision time analyzed as 
function of accuracy (Table 2)
Pass Answer
Proportion correct compared 
⇒     for answered and passed 
questio ns (Table 1, Figs 2,5)
↓↓
↓ Response given
↓
↓ No confidence 
rating group
Confidence rating 
group
↓↓ ↓
↓↓ Indicate confidence 
on 100 point scale
Confidence ratings analyzed 
⇒  as a function of answer/ 
pass decision and decision 
time (Table 3, Figs 3,6)
↓↓ ↓
Repeat until all 10 questions seen
↓
Repeat until all 6 categories seen
↓
“Passed” questions re -presented, response requested 
along with confidence rating (if in that group)
↓
Predictions correlated 
with per formance   ⇐
(Table 3)
Rate (a) how well you did on the 10 questions presented 
and (b) how well you would do on a new set of 10 
questions
↓
Internet search task (Web browser open for 10 mins)
Instructed to search for 
relevant information
Instructed simply to 
browse the internet
Proportion of questions 
searched for analyzed as       
⇒  function of answer/pass 
decision and decision time 
(Figs 4,7)
↓↓
Predictions correlated 
with performance    ⇐
(Table 3)
Rate (a) how well you did on the 10  questions 
presented and (b) how well you would do on a new set of 
10 questions
↓ ↓
Fig. 1 Flow-chart illustrating the experimental procedure and summarizing the dependent variables used as
indicators of self-assessment and self-monitoring
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123responses would be subtracted from the number of correct responses to determine their
total score. As such, they were told they should only answer a question if they felt
conﬁdent in their ability to do so accurately.
To begin, they were shown a list of the 6 categories, asked to select the one in which
they were most conﬁdent, then asked to estimate how many questions (out of 10) they
expected to get right within that category. After completing this process, the 10 questions
from the selected category were presented. When the ﬁrst question from within that cat-
egory was presented the amount of time the participant took to decide whether or not to
attempt to answer the question (indicated by clicking on an ‘‘Answer’’ or a ‘‘Pass’’ button)
was measured. If the participant clicked the ‘‘Pass’’ button, the question disappeared and
the next question was presented. If the respondent clicked the ‘‘Answer’’ button, a free text
box was presented and the participant was asked to type in a response.
Participants were randomized into one of two groups: a ‘‘no conﬁdence rating’’ con-
dition (group 1) or a ‘‘conﬁdence rating’’ condition (group 2). After answering the ques-
tion, those in group 1 were simply presented with the next question and asked, again, to
make an answer/pass decision. Those in group 2 were additionally prompted, after
answering the question, to use a 100-point rating scale indicating how conﬁdent they were
that the answer they just provided was correct.
The procedure continued in this way (presentation of a question, a decision to answer or
not, answering if they chose to try, giving a conﬁdence rating if in group 2, then the next
question being presented) until all 10 questions from the selected category had been
presented. The procedure was then repeated (select their next best category, estimate their
likely number of correct answers, and respond to the 10 questions successively) for each of
the remaining 5 categories.
After completing the procedure for all 6 categories, participants were shown, in
sequence, all the questions they chose not to answer on the ﬁrst round. For this second
round, they were told that the correction factor had been removed and that they should,
therefore, take their best guess at the correct response for every item. Again, those in group
2 were asked to assign conﬁdence ratings each time a response was given.
After completing both rounds of the test, participants were asked, for each category, to
indicate (a) how many questions they thought they answered correctly and (b) how many
questions they would anticipate answering correctly were a new set of 10 questions to be
presented to them in the future.
A web browser was then opened to google.com and participants were told that they
should spend 10 min browsing the internet while the researcher prepared the ﬁnal task in
the experiment. Half of the participants in the ‘‘conﬁdence rating’’ group and half in the
‘‘no conﬁdence rating’’ group were randomized to receive speciﬁc instructions to search for
answers to the questions with which they had just been presented. The remaining partic-
ipants were not directed to search for any particular material. We recorded the google
search terms entered and web sites visited, and later coded each web site based on the trivia
question to which it likely corresponded (if any).
Finally, after 10 min the browser closed and participants were again asked to respond,
for each of the six categories of trivia, to the two questions described earlier (accuracy on
this test and anticipated accuracy on a similar test in the future).
Analysis
To address the self-assessment literature Pearson’s correlations were used to calculate the
relationship between performance and participant’s ratings of how well they anticipated
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compared decision time, proportion correct, conﬁdence ratings (group 2), and the number
of question-relevant websites visited during the internet search task as a function of
whether or not participants chose to respond to a given question and the accuracy of the
response generated. ANOVA or paired samples t-tests were used as inferential statistics
in these instances. The procedure, and a summary of the dependent measures are illustrated
in Fig. 1.
Study 1: Results and discussion
The number, gender and average age of participants was 51 (26 male, age = 20.12). For
analyses that did not explicitly address the ‘‘in the moment’’ conﬁdence ratings (elicited
from group 2), there were no signiﬁcant effects of this additional task on outcome mea-
sures, suggesting that the explicit self monitoring instruction did not alter participants’
overall self-assessment accuracy, their self-monitoring behaviours, or their subsequent
information seeking behaviour. Thus, for these analyses data from both groups are
collapsed and treated as a single group.
Overall self-assessments (groups 1 and 2 together)
Replicating the typical approach to studying self-assessment, we examined participants’
overall self-assessments in comparison to their actual performance. Participants’ mean
performance score (and standard deviation) was 34.0% correct (SD = 16.3%). Their mean
predictions regarding anticipated performance was 44.7% correct (SD = 13.6%). Paired
sample t-tests revealed that performance was statistically lower than predictions
(p\0.05).
We also correlated, for each of the 6 trivia categories, participants’ actual performance
and their predictions regarding how many correct answers they would provide for each
category. The mean (and range) of Pearson’s r values for the six domains were r = 0.28
(0.15–0.42), thereby replicating the typical poor correlation between predictions and
performance seen in most self-assessment studies.
Self-monitoring: knowing when to defer (groups 1 and 2 together)
Participants chose to offer an answer the ﬁrst time they were presented with a question
41.3% of the time. Comparing the percent correct achieved during round 1 (i.e., when
participants chose to respond to the questions presented) to that of round 2 (i.e., the
questions for which candidates opted not to answer until the correction factor was
removed) provides one opportunity to determine whether or not participants were able to
self-monitor. Consistent with data reported by Eva and Regehr (2007), participants
revealed greater accuracy rates in round 1 (72.6%) relative to round 2 (6.8%). The
difference was statistically signiﬁcant (p\0.001) using a paired samples t-test.
Self-monitoring: slowing down at the borders of competence (groups 1 and 2 together)
To determine whether participants were showing appropriate caution and slowing down at
the borders of their competence, we calculated the amount of time it took to decide whether
316 K. W. Eva, G. Regehr
123or not to answer a given question in relation to the accuracy of the eventual response. If
participants are slowing appropriately at the edge of their competence, then for questions
that participants chose to answer on the ﬁrst round, slower decisions (to answer) should be
associated with lower accuracy relative to faster decisions. Similarly, for questions that
participants decided NOT to answer in the ﬁrst round, slower decisions (to pass) should be
associated with HIGHER accuracy relative to faster decisions. The data conﬁrmed this
pattern, again replicating the ﬁndings reported by Eva and Regehr (2007). Figure 2
elaborates on this pattern by graphing mean proportion correct as a function of response
time (with response time bundles selected to roughly equate the number of observations in
each column) and whether participants chose to answer on round 1 or deferred their
response to round 2.
Self-monitoring: conﬁdence ratings (group 2 data only)
To test whether or not participants were able to explicitly report their likelihood of success
and to determine whether or not being prompted to do so altered their capacity to self-
monitor, half of all participants (n = 26) were asked to rate their conﬁdence in each
response whenever they answered a question. For comparability with earlier analyses we
averaged the conﬁdence ratings provided within each category and correlated these ratings
with within category performance. These moment-by-moment assessments were more
related to performance than were the general self-assessments of participants’ conﬁdence
in their knowledge of the domain (i.e., their predictions of performance). The mean (and
range of) correlations across domain between these question-by-question conﬁdence rat-
ings and performance were r = 0.81 (0.66–0.91). Further, conﬁdence ratings were found to
map well onto decision times in a pattern very similar to that seen in the accuracy rates.
Figure 3 replicates Fig. 2, plotting conﬁdence ratings rather than proportion correct on the
y-axis.
Learning activity: the internet search task (groups 1 and 2 together)
After answering all 60 trivia questions participants were given 10 min worth of access to
the internet. During this time the rate at which they searched for information relevant to the
trivia questions did not reveal a consistent effect of instruction to search for related
information. The proportion of questions for which participants searched did, however,
Fig. 2 Mean proportion correct as a function of whether participant chose to answer during round 1 or to
defer answering until round 2 and time taken to make the decision in study 1
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defer responding. Questions on which participants chose to defer were searched for more
often (mean = 33.1% of the deferred questions) relative to questions participants opted to
answer (mean = 7.9% of the answered questions). These differences were statistically
signiﬁcant (p\0.001) using a paired samples t-test. The rate of searching for question-
related information was similar for both questions answered correctly and those answered
incorrectly. The likelihood of searching for a response to a question was generally greater
when participants took longer to make their decision regarding whether to answer or defer
as illustrated in Fig. 4.
Post-exercise self-assessments
To determine whether or not the accurate self-monitoring that participants demonstrated in
this study translated into improved overall self-assessments of performance we examined
the correlation between performance and participants’ self-assessments, both immediately
following the test and after completing the internet search, by asking (a) how many
questions were answered correctly within each category during the study and (b) how many
questions would be answered correctly were a new set of 10 questions from within each
Fig. 3 Mean conﬁdence ratings as a function of whether participant chose to answer during round 1 or to
defer answering until round 2 and time taken to make the decision in study 1
Fig. 4 Proportion of time question-relevant information was sought during a 10-minute internet search task
as a function of whether participant chose to answer during round 1 or to defer answering until round 2 and
time taken to make the decision in study 1
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correlated with one another we calculated an average post-performance score for use in our
analyses. Consistent with other literature, the self-assessment correlations post-perfor-
mance were somewhat higher than those offered prior to performance. The mean (and
range) of correlations were r = 0.66 (0.59–0.72).
Summary
The ﬁndings of study 1 replicate and extend the work of Eva and Regehr (2007), dem-
onstrating that moment-by-moment self-monitoring elicits different (and apparently more
accurate) indications of awareness of the limits of one’s competence than do more tradi-
tionally collected overarching estimates of one’s ability (i.e., the global self-assessments of
ability in each domain). The additional collection of conﬁdence ratings in the current study
demonstrates that respondents were indeed consciously aware of the likelihood that they
would answer any given question correctly. Interestingly, the requirement to rate one’s
conﬁdence on a question by question basis did not impact upon the patterns of data seen in
the other measures collected.
Study 2 extends these ﬁndings by testing for the same pattern of data in a new set of
trivia questions and by further by comparing the pattern of results seen in the context of
responding to short answer questions to the pattern seen when responding to multiple
choice questions (with the decisions to answer or not occurring before the choices are
presented).
Study 2: Methods
Study2wasidenticaltostudy1withtwoexceptions.First,toensurethegeneralizabiltyofthe
ﬁndings,newquestionswereselected.Thesequestionsweredrawnfromavarietyofrecently
published trivia games using the same categories with the exception that media and the arts
replacedpre-1990sentertainment.Second,responseformatwastreatedasavariableinstudy
2.Aftereachquestionwaspresentedandparticipantschosetoanswer,someparticipantswere
presentedwiththesamefreetextresponseboxaswasusedbyparticipantsenrolledinstudy1.
Others were presented with four response options and were asked simply to indicate which
option wasthe correct answer. Respondents in the ‘‘conﬁdence rating’’ group (group 2) were
still asked to assign conﬁdence ratings after making aresponse and, in all cases, the response
format of round 1 was maintained during round 2 (i.e., when participants were asked to
respond to questions on which they passed during round 1).
Study 2: Results and discussion
The number, gender and average age of participants was 90 (31 male, age = 18.59). As in
study 1, there were no signiﬁcant effects of the ‘‘conﬁdence rating’’ task on outcome
measures leading us to collapse across this variable and examine both groups together
when possible to do so.
Overall, the patterns of data for the SAQ condition of this study replicated the patterns
seen in study 1. The effects were slightly, but not substantially smaller. By contrast, the
patterns of data for the MCQ condition were generally much (signiﬁcantly) smaller and
often were not statistically signiﬁcant. The details of the results are presented below.
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Mean performance scores (and standard deviations) for the SAQ and MCQ conditions were
25.6% (SD = 9.4%), and 42.9% (SD = 9.0%), respectively. Mean candidate predictions
regarding their anticipated performance were 38.1% (SD = 11.9%), and 44.7% (SD =
13.7%), respectively. Paired sample t-tests revealed that performance was statistically
lower than predictions (p\0.05) in the SAQ condition, but not in the MCQ format
(i.e., the format in which performance attributable to chance would be highest).
The correlations between participants’ actual performance and their predictions
regarding how many correct answers they would provide for each category had a mean
(and range) of r = 0.31 (0.14–0.51), and r = 0.18 (0.01–0.36) for the SAQ and MCQ
conditions, respectively.
Self-monitoring: knowing when to defer (groups 1 and 2 together)
Participants chose to offer an answer the ﬁrst time they were presented with a question
32.6% of the time in the SAQ condition and 60.4% of the time in the MCQ version (chi-
squared = 400, p\0.001), thereby indicating that participants were indeed more likely to
anticipate being able to answer a question correctly when they knew response options
would be presented relative to when participating in the SAQ condition.
Comparing the percent correct achieved during round 1 to that of round 2 revealed a
signiﬁcantly smaller difference in the MCQ version of the experiment relative to the SAQ
version (for the ANOVA interaction between answer format and round F1,86 = 63.7,
p\.001), but for both conditions, the difference between round 1 and round 2 accuracy
were statistically signiﬁcant (p\0.001). Table 1 summarizes these ﬁndings along with
those of study 1.
Self-monitoring: slowing down at the borders of competence (groups 1 and 2 together)
To determine whether participants were showing appropriate caution and slowing down at
the borders of their competence, we calculated the amount of time it took to decide whether
or not to answer a given question in relation to the accuracy of the eventual response. The
mean decision times, illustrated in Table 2 conﬁrmed the pattern seen in study 1 and
reported by Eva and Regehr (2007).
However, again, the pattern of data was smaller for the MCQ condition. For questions
answered in round 1, there was a signiﬁcant interaction between accuracy and answer
format (F1,88 = 6.14, p\.05), although there was no signiﬁcant interaction for round 2
data. In fact, while the differences were in the predicted direction for the MCQ condition,
they were not signiﬁcant for round 1 or round 2.
Table 1 Percent correct responses provided to items respondents chose to answer in round 1 relative to
those they deferred answering until round 2
Answered in
round 1 (%)
Deferred until
round 2 (%)
p-value
Study 1 72.6 6.8 \0.001
Study 2 (short answer questions) 54.4 11.7 \0.001
Study 2 (multiple choice questions) 49.9 32.3 \0.001
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slope of the line for round 1 answers was signiﬁcantly negative (p\.001) and the slope of
the line for round 2 responses was marginally signiﬁcantly positive (p = .052). For the
MCQ condition the pattern of data trend in the appropriate directions. The slopes are not
signiﬁcantly different from zero, but they are also not signiﬁcantly different from the
corresponding slopes in the SAQ condition.
Self-monitoring: conﬁdence ratings (group 2 data only)
Forty six respondents performed the item by item conﬁdence ratings (28 in the SAQ
condition and 18 in the MCQ condition). The correlations between conﬁdence ratings and
performance were variable across condition, but in each case the moment-by-moment
assessments were more related to performance than were the general self-assessments of
Table 2 Mean time (in seconds) taken to make a decision regarding whether to answer or defer answering
as a function of the decision made and the accuracy of the answer given
Answered in round 1 Deferred until round 2
Correct Incorrect p-value Correct Incorrect p-value
Study 1 6.7 11.9 \0.001 8.5 6.6 \0.001
Study 2 (short answer questions) 6.6 9.8 \0.001 7.2 6.3 0.06
Study 2 (multiple choice questions) 4.3 4.8 NS 5.0 4.9 NS
Fig. 5 Mean proportion correct as a function of whether participant chose to answer during round 1 or to
defer answering until round 2 and time taken to make the decision in study 2
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formance). The mean (and range of) correlations across domain between these question-
by-question conﬁdence ratings and performance were r = 0.47 (0.43–0.50) in the SAQ
condition and r = 0.29 (0.09–0.40) in the MCQ condition.
Further, conﬁdence ratings were again found to map well onto decision times in a
pattern very similar to that seen in the accuracy rates. Figure 6 replicates Fig. 5, plotting
conﬁdence ratings rather than proportion correct on the y-axis. For the SAQ condition, the
slope of the line for round 1 conﬁdence ratings was signiﬁcantly negative and the slope of
the line for round 2 responses was signiﬁcantly positive (for both p\.05). For the MCQ
condition the pattern of data trend in the appropriate directions. The slopes are not sig-
niﬁcantly different from zero, but they are also not signiﬁcantly different from the cor-
responding slopes in the SAQ condition.
Learning activity: the internet search task (groups 1 and 2 together)
As seen in study 1, the proportion of questions for which participants searched revealed a
consistent relationship with whether participants had earlier decided to answer or defer
responding. Questions on which participants chose to defer were searched for more often
(mean = 23.3%, and 14.5% for the SAQ and MCQ conditions, respectively) relative to
questions participants opted to answer (mean = 6.5%, and 5.2%, respectively). These
differences were statistically signiﬁcant (t[4.5, p\0.001) in both instances. The rate of
searching for question-related information was similar for both questions answered cor-
rectly and those answered incorrectly. The likelihood of searching for a response to a
Fig. 6 Mean conﬁdence ratings as a function of whether participant chose to answer during round 1 or to
defer answering until round 2 and time taken to make the decision in study 2
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regarding whether to answer or defer as illustrated in Fig. 7.
Post-exercise self-assessments
Consistent with study 1, the self-assessment correlations post-performance were somewhat
higher than those offered prior to performance. The mean (and range) of correlations across
SAQ and MCQ conditions were r = 0.39 (0.24–0.53) and r = 0.23 (0.08–0.42), respec-
tively. For ease of comparison all sets of correlations across both studies have been
combined into Table 3.
Fig. 7 Proportion of time question-relevant information was sought during a 10-min internet search task as
a function of whether participant chose to answer during round 1 or to defer answering until round 2 and
time taken to make the decision in study 2
Table 3 Correlations (Pearson’s r) between overall performance score and self-assessment as a function of
when and how the self-assessments were collected
Correlation between
performance score and …
Study 1 Study 2 (short
answer questions)
Study 2 (multiple
choice questions)
…overall prediction prior to performance 0.28 0.31 0.18
…overall self-assessment collected
after performance
0.66 0.39 0.23
…in the moment conﬁdence ratings 0.81 0.47 0.29
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The intent of this pair of studies was to extend our understanding of the difference
between, and the relationship between overall self-assessments of performance or ability
and moment-by-moment self-monitoring of performance. In particular, we were motivated
by three broad questions:
1. Was the accurate self-monitoring observed in prior work an indication of participants
being consciously aware of the likelihood of responding accurately on a moment-
to-moment basis?
2. Does the act of self-monitoring inﬂuence participants’ self-directed information search
strategies in a way that leads them to seek out information relevant to improving their
performance?
3. Does the experience of self-monitoring and the opportunity to seek out information
relevant to prior testing experiences alter participants’ self-assessments?
This discussion will address each of these questions in turn.
1. Was the accurate self-monitoring observed in prior work an indication of participants
being consciously aware of the likelihood of responding accurately on a moment-
to-moment basis?
In prior work (Eva and Regehr 2007), two behavioural indices (deferring responding to
questions on which one is less likely to be correct and taking longer to decide to make this
decision for questions that were at the border of one’s competence) were used as a measure
of self-monitoring during performance as a mechanism to methodologically distinguish
this form of self-assessment from the more traditional construction of self-assessment as an
overall assessment of performance or ability. While results from that earlier work dem-
onstrated that participants did indeed slow down when at the edges of competence and
generally defer answering on items that one is objectively less likely to answer correctly,
the mechanism by which this process occurred was under speciﬁed. In particular, it was not
clear whether these behaviours were related to explicit conﬁdence levels or were largely
implicit and unconscious in their enactment. The current studies suggest that these phe-
nomena are at least accessible to conscious conﬁdence assessments, in that the conﬁdence
ratings collected on a moment-to-moment basis mimicked both deferral behaviour and
response time patterns (see Figs. 2, 3, 5, 6).
That the correlations between performance and moment-by-moment conﬁdence ratings
were highly variable across study indicates that one should not assume self-monitoring to
be accurate. That said, the consistency with which these correlations have been found to be
more strongly related to actual performance than were participants’ self-assessments of the
strength of their knowledge (Table 3), further increases the likelihood that self-monitoring
requires a fundamentally different cognitive process than does self-assessment. In the case
of self-monitoring, the judge has many sources of information available to him that enable
inferences to be drawn about the likelihood of success on a moment-to-moment basis. For
example, the amount of cognitive effort engaged, as indicated by the time required to
determine whether or not one knows the correct response, can indicate whether or not one’s
eventual response is likely to be accurate (Robinson, Johnson, and Herndon 1997). By
contrast, self-assessment, deﬁned as a more global judgment of one’s strength in a given
domain, requires searching one’s memory (albeit perhaps unconsciously) for past events to
determine not only what activities/content comprise the domain, but also what our prior
rate of success has been in successfully acting within the context of those activities. In
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to mentally aggregate that perception over many experiences. Many areas of psychology
suggest that these types of aggregate-level decisions tend to be biased by particularly
memorable (i.e., available) information (Tversky and Koehler 1994; Ross and Nisbett
1991), so it is implausible to imagine that these types of decisions could yield accurate
indications of ability. Further, the intuition most of us have that we can self-assess (Pronin
et al. 2002) may result from our many experiences of accurate self-monitoring being
translated into a belief about our ability for overall self assessment. Again, our data suggest
that such a translation is inappropriate. The fact that self-monitoring may indeed be
effective should not be mistaken as evidence that overall self-assessments are accurate.
Indeed, one cannot even assume that self-monitoring will always be highly accurate.
While the correlations between performance and conﬁdence ratings were consistently
higher than those between performance and overall self-assessments, there was a consid-
erable range (from a high of 0.81 in study 1 to a low of 0.29 in the MCQ version of study
2). The only difference between the SAQ version of study 2 and study 1 were the materials
(i.e., questions). While preliminary in nature, ﬁnding that the effects were less pronounced
in the MCQ version of study 2 relative to the SAQ questions (despite both using the same
questions) suggests that it would be a mistake to presume that self-monitoring will be
effective as long as judgments of the limits of one’s competence are collected in the
moment of the performance. By alerting respondents to the fact that response options
would be presented after they decided to answer a given question we observed that
respondents were almost twice as likely to choose to answer (and, therefore, half as likely
to pass) relative to when they knew they would be responsible for generating their
response. Further work is required to tease apart the extent to which the resulting differ-
ences in the indices of self-monitoring reported in this paper were an inﬂuence of changing
the cognitive task from one of judging whether or not one could generate the response (in
the free text version of the experimental design) versus adding a layer of prediction
regarding the likelihood of recognizing the correct response. The latter arguably moves
more towards a self-assessment from a self-monitoring judgment because it requires a
prediction of the extent of one’s knowledge base despite the judgment being elicited in the
moment of struggle with a particular problem. Perhaps it is not the temporal nature of the
judgments that enable accurate self-monitoring, but the constraint to base judgments on the
readiness with which the actual problem solution can be generated rather than an abstract
judgment of the likelihood of success. Indeed, the Feeling-of-Knowing literature suggests
that the instruction used in the MCQ version of study 2 may be particularly effective at
eliciting inaccurate Feeling-of-Knowing judgments as Widner and Smith (1996) have
shown that asking participants to indicate what they believe they ‘‘know’’ elicits poorer
accuracy in those judgments relative to asking them outright if they are likely to ‘‘rec-
ognize’’ the correct answer. The authors conclude that Feeling-of-Knowing judgments are
better when they incorporate task-relevant information into the instructions, a phenomenon
that warrants further study with respect to its implications for self-regulated learning in
health professional education.
2. Does the act of self-monitoring inﬂuence participants’ self-directed information
search strategies in a way that leads them to seek out information relevant to improving
their performance?
It is intriguing that participants in both of the studies in this paper, when not given any
instruction regarding how to spend their time using the internet, searched for information
relevant to the questions they had just been presented at a rate equal to the group of
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Optimistically, this could provide an indication that it is a natural response to try and
improve when given clear guidance about the limits of one’s knowledge and the resources
to do so, especially given that there was no reward associated with this activity in this
context beyond the personal satisfaction of conﬁrming one’s responses or learning infor-
mation that was previously unknown or misremembered. Less optimistically, the rate of
questions on which participants searched was relatively low in both studies, reaching a
maximum of 23% in this brief posttest situation. The simple act of prompting people to
explicitly evaluate their conﬁdence in their responses did not alter the rate at which
participants sought knowledge relevant to the challenges put before them. However, opting
to defer giving a response and the length of time taken to make that decision were both
inﬂuential, as illustrated in Figs. 4 and 7.
Further research is required to fully explore the implications of these ﬁndings, but the
results suggest that there may be motivational beneﬁts to tailoring educational efforts to the
limits of a students’ ability. This notion is consistent with Bjork’s theory of desirable
difﬁculties (1999), which suggests learners must be placed in situations that elicit errors
(and often make learning seem harder/less successful) for learning to be optimized. In
situations in which participants could quickly decide that they knew or did not know the
answer they were less inclined to spend time searching for information than they were
in situations that prompted them to think for a longer period. The lack of correlation with
accuracy suggests that students were not falling prey to conﬁrmation bias, but rather, were
searching for information they inferred should be within their reach even if that grasp came
up short in the speciﬁc instance.
3. Does the experience of self-monitoring and the opportunity to seek out information
relevant to prior testing experiences alter participants’ self-assessments?
Above, we highlighted reasons that self-assessments, deﬁned as global judgments of
ability, come to be inaccurate. The post-test self-assessments provide further hints about
why this might be the case. While the three correlations between self-assessments collected
at the end of the study and performance rose relative to the pre-test self-assessments they
remained lower than the correlations between performance and moment-to-moment con-
ﬁdence ratings even though participants had the opportunity to view the questions and
search the internet for conﬁrmation/refutation of their responses. Using Bjork’s model, the
presentation of speciﬁc test questions can be thought of as inducing a stimulus that pro-
vides the individual with information regarding their ability beyond the introspective
judgments that arise from searching memory (explicitly or implicitly) for the answer to the
question of how well have I performed in this area in the past? On one hand, the improved
correlations provide further evidence that participants were aware, in the moment, of the
strength of their performance as they were able to use this information to alter their
perceptions. At the same time, however, that the correlations did not achieve the same
magnitude as the moment-by-moment conﬁdence ratings suggests that even within this
relatively constrained context, in which memory for the experience is as active as it will
ever be, the aggregation of this information was imperfect. We would hypothesize (but did
not examine within these studies) that the correlation between post-performance ratings
and actual performance will decline with increasing time between performance and self-
assessment, a pattern that would provide further support for the notion that poor self-
assessment is predominantly a reﬂection of the non-literal and imperfect nature of human
memory.
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participants did not know precisely which questions would be asked, but that explanation
would not account for the difference in correlations with performance observed for post-
test self-assessments and self-monitoring. At the same time, that argument reinforces the
more central point that self-assessment alone can not be relied upon as a mechanism for
judging one’s overall skill level as every situation is inevitably a narrow sample of a
broader domain that cannot be fully anticipated until the individual is embedded within the
experience. That participants’ self-perceptions were not fully inﬂuenced by their recent
experience is consistent with the arguments put forward in the social psychology literature
that it is adaptive to maintain an optimistic outlook on one’s ability (see Eva and Regehr
2005; Kluger and van Dijk 2010). That is, empirical ﬁndings from this literature suggest
that individuals tend to perform better when they expect to perform better, thereby indi-
cating that not only can we not create good self-assessors (thanks to the cognitive limits
inherent in aggregation as (described above) and context speciﬁcity), but perhaps that we
should not even try (because lowering a poor performer’s self-assessment to meet their
actual performance may be counter-productive, lowering the likelihood of reaching a
higher level over time).
Rather, the goal of focusing upon self-assessment should be to use understanding of this
construct as a means to the end of improving practice. People often express concern about
poor self-assessment as a way of drawing attention to (and overcoming) issues of patient
safety. Patient safety is undeniably an issue that must take on top priority, but if the
ﬁndings reported in this paper generalize to clinical contexts, then we can have some
conﬁdence that individuals are self-limiting their activities more appropriately than the
historical self-assessment literature would lead one to believe, even if they are generally
overconﬁdent in their abilities. It also suggests that we should take advantage of and
determine if we can extend these abilities for self-monitoring by focusing our efforts on
ensuring that individuals learn to recognize the cues that they should perhaps slow down
(cf. Moulton et al. 2007) and look up the information they need rather than worrying about
whether or not they are able to translate such experiences into broader classiﬁcations of
their proﬁciency as a clinician (Lee 2010). Finally, we would note that whether or not there
are individual differences in the capacity to self-monitor and whether or not such capacity
can be taught if there are those who lack it remain to be seen. Indeed, these are the key
limitations of the work presented in this report as the extent to which these materials
generalize to a clinical context, to domains of greater perceived urgency or relevance
relative to general knowledge of trivia, or to domains of competence beyond declarative
knowledge have not yet been tested. Having used different materials across study and
different response formats we are conﬁdent in the robustness of the ﬁndings (again with the
caveat that the effects were generally smaller in the MCQ format), but what other con-
textual variables and personal factors inﬂuence that robustness remain a subject for future
study. Even so, the difference in implications that are drawn from focusing on self-
monitoring (i.e., the need to create situations for learners and practitioners to experience
the limits of their competence in the presence of feedback and improvement strategies
tailored to those experiences) rather than self-assessment (i.e., the notion that we can
improve practice and education through improving the capacity of individuals to assess
their own strengths and weaknesses in an effort to self-identify performance improvement
strategies) emphasizes the importance of carefully distinguishing between what appear to
be very different cognitive processes with very different potential given the literature that
has accumulated to date.
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